Before West Ham’s Premier League season restarts with a trip to Arsenal on Boxing Day, let’s take a look back at the first half of the season and review the progress (or otherwise) of the team and the individuals within. In today’s edition, we’ll be looking at data relating to team trends.
There has been growing discussion over West Ham’s need to stylistically and tactically progress and, although some may find this ridiculous given the success that David Moyes’ side have experienced over recent seasons, the suggestion is not unmerited. As with any team in the Premier League, there is a requirement to make changes over time in order to continue to present new challenges for the opposition. Pep Guardiola’s Manchester City were hugely successful last season, often without a recognised number nine, but have pivoted this season to include Erling Haaland. The Norwegian may not make many touches, in sharp distinction to the false nine types we’ve often seen leading the line for Guardiola’s teams, but his 18 goals in 13 Premier League games speak to the effectiveness with which he’s been utilised by the Citizens. Back in Gameweek One, we covered just how well Manchester City had managed this transition to incorporate a more traditional striker, and how the different threats presented would create new challenges for the sides they would face throughout the season.
Since West Ham’s move away from playing both Pablo Fornals and a direct attacking presence like Saïd Benrahma or Jesse Lingard in the number ten and wide-left positions in December 2021, it has become increasingly clear that the Hammers need to find new ways to progress the ball while maintaining their ability to commit numbers to the box to support attacks. This period began after a high-scoring opening to the 2021-22 season when Moyes moved away from this model, which often contained overenthusiastic individual pressure attempts exposing the midfield, to include Manuel Lanzini in the side – a calming presence that could smoothen West Ham’s build-up and allow for a little more control out of possession.
In the first half of the 2021-22 season, West Ham scored an average of 1.79 goals per game while conceding 1.32. After the switch halfway through, goals scored dropped to 1.42 but goals against remained consistent at 1.32. The way in which West Ham used the ball had shifted slightly but the real-terms results weren’t exactly positive.
This isn’t to say that Lanzini’s initial inclusion wasn’t correct. Back in late winter last season, we were talking about just how crucial the Argentine had become since his reintroduction to the side in December. His vertical movement to drop off the front line and drag players with him was key to opening gaps further up the pitch and allowing the side to actually progress play; the combination of Souček and Rice didn’t quite have the requisite progressive ability to play through consistently but with Lanzini dropping off to assist, it felt as though Moyes had found much greater control.
Solving one issue had created others though, and Lanzini’s final third activity (or lack thereof), tracked alongside the cut in goals scored that we looked at earlier. Taking 0.66 shots per 90 and amassing a meagre 0.07 npxG per game, Lanzini wasn’t able to get anywhere near the offensive contributions logged by Jesse Lingard the season prior (2.53 shots, 0.18 npxG).
Looking at how West Ham’s npxG has moved over time compared to their opponents reflects this shift in the second half of the 2021-22 season.
Solving these issues while maintaining the same principles would make recruiting additional quality in build-up a necessity and finding someone who could replicate Lanzini’s build-up contribution while holding greater final third threat a much needed luxury. It would seem that the club had found solutions in both these areas in the circa £70 million spent on Nayef Aguerd and Lucas Paquetá.
Both recruited from Ligue 1, Aguerd and Paquetá would seem to have the necessary skills to alleviate the issues that Moyes’ side were experiencing in the happy medium between a more gung-ho approach of four direct attackers and a midfield three by proxy with a number ten that could drop off and contribute deeper. Aguerd, and his 2.73 progressive passes per 90 alongside an 88.9% average pass accuracy, would add significant quality to West Ham’s build-up – for comparison, Craig Dawson recorded just 1.01 progressive passes per 90 with an overall 80.5% pass accuracy last season, while Kurt Zouma managed one progressive pass with 87.6% average accuracy. And Paquetá would be happy to drop off, he is comfortable enough to feature in a double-pivot alongside Casemiro for Brazil, but he still took 2.87 shots per 90 in Ligue 1 from 0.34 npxG last season.
So, what is going wrong?
To begin to explore the data surrounding West Ham over the last few seasons and to dry and draw out changes in the way in which the team have used the ball and defended without it, I began to look at different ways in which we can look at the notion of efficiency. Purely xG focused methods tend to bias in favour of the big teams, or at least the teams that attempt to dominate games through possession, so how can we draw out the successes of teams with smaller budgets that may employ styles that are often considered a little more brutish?
Subscribe to continue reading
Subscribe today to access the rest of this article and all other members content.
