In the first two editions of The Data Review, prior to West Ham’s 1-3 loss to Arsenal and 0-2 loss against Brentford, we looked at the ways in which the team is failing to functionalize David Moyes’ passive, counter-attacking approach with new acquisitions that are perhaps better suited to different strategies. In the first part we looked at failures in front of goal so far this season and trends in attacking output across the last three seasons; and in the second part we looked at the attacking efficiency and defensive effectiveness of the side over time through the lens of “Possession Value” – when comparing the trends over time elucidated via this method there were clear similarities with equally concerning npxG trends.
In this final edition of the series, we will look at the possible conclusions for the current approach and begin to suggest alternate methods to arrest the ongoing slide.
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Against Arsenal on Monday, it was clear that West Ham lacked the off-ball intensity necessary to actualise traps to force turnovers in central areas: With the system comfortable ceding space in wide areas, what previously functioned as an effective way to force opposition teams to cross into an aerially dominant defensive unit or risk entering central areas and losing the ball due to West Ham’s rapid midfield constriction, now allows for wide progression without the central traps to stop access to Zone 14 (the dangerous zone around the D). This ultimately leads to chance concession.
Historically, West Ham were able to maximise the aerial dominance of central defenders like Craig Dawson, Kurt Zouma, and Angelo Ogbonna while protecting those same players from being exposed to facing direct attacking threats moving at pace in central zones. Now, we regularly see failures in both these previously strong aspects of West Ham’s defence. Though the Hammers still concede fewer opportunities than most sides in the division, thanks to the comfortability of the team to drop-off and defend extremely deep in such a way that limits the threatening space the opposition can realistically enter, individual errors have become a huge problem throughout the 2022-23 season.
Nayef Aguerd’s injuries since his arrival from Rennes have meant that Thilo Kehrer has regularly featured in David Moyes’ defensive line. And whilst the German has strengths that would likely be well utilised in a back three system, appearing in this retreating backline often exposes Kehrer to 1v1 situations from crosses and his 42.1% aerial success rate so far this season doesn’t quite guarantee the same security of the starting centre-backs last season (Angelo Ogbonna – 69.2%, Craig Dawson – 62.8%, Kurt Zouma – 61.7%).
Vladimír Coufal’s struggling form has also led to Kehrer regularly featuring at right-back where he doesn’t have the athleticism or offensive ability to offer the same kind of overlapping threat in support of Jarrod Bowen. And that lack of athleticism also underpins his inability to recover which has left Moyes’ side soft to counters on too many occasions this season.
These were issues that you’d hope the management would have anticipated in some way but Aguerd’s injuries – the Moroccan won 65.1% of his aerial duels last season and is an excellent recovering defender – in combination with Kurt Zouma’s fitness issues have unfortunately perpetuated a defensive vulnerability that has undermined many of the tactical possibilities for this team.
What can we do about it?
The key thing, short-term solutions aside, is getting Zouma and Aguerd back fit and playing in the league together. With those two at the base of the side, West Ham should once again be able to rely on defensive security from crosses while being more able to engage higher up the pitch with both players theoretically combining the right degree of proactive pressing potential and recoverability.
In the time without the pair, Moyes has largely stuck to variations of a 4-2-3-1 or 4-4-2 mid-block but he has also opted for a back three system on occasion. And whilst the potential of a back three system is theoretically engaging – the Europa Conference League has allowed for the kind of experimentation that has revealed the potential of some of the players within this structure – West Ham currently lack the true talent required in the wing-back positions to fully realise this approach. In Coufal and Emerson, Moyes does have full-backs that would be perfectly comfortable playing as wing-backs but neither quite possess the kind of final third threat needed to compensate for the withdrawal of an attacker.
We saw the conclusions of this drawn out in the match against Brentford where the system presented solutions for previously stagnant build-up but resulted in failures to penetrate in central areas or unlock the opposition defence from wide. The wing-backs were regularly left 1v1, or with room to cross, but neither could find a killer delivery at any stage.
So, with a back three ruled out due to the lack of talent at wing-back, and with the 4-2-3-1 / 4-4-2 mid-block failing, what options are left?
Throughout this season, fans have pointed to a 4-3-3 system as one that would offer a great deal of additional attacking potential. Bowen, Cornet, Saïd Benrahma and Michail Antonio would all be comfortable featuring in the wide roles either side of a striker and, in some ways, Benrahma – who has occasionally offered inspiration at times of great insipidity – would be benefited by a change in system that would allow him to operate higher and wider. We saw how bamboozled the Algerian was when he was tasked with tracking Ben White across the full length of the left flank against Arsenal and a 4-3-3 would release him from some of the recovering defensive responsibilities with which he struggles so much.
Despite this, there may be a stronger argument for one of Antonio or Cornet (if the Ivorian ever returns to fitness) to feature in this wide-left role.
But isn’t Antonio a striker now?
Didier Deschamps’ France presented some interesting ideas during the World Cup with their implementation of a hybrid 4-3-3 / 4-4-2. This system saw Kylian Mbappé used on the left of an attacking three with little wide recovering responsibility as Adrien Rabiot covered while Antoine Griezmann dropped into a midfield two alongside Aurélien Tchouameni.
The main issue this system encountered was the lack of pressure initiated by the resultant front two in the defensive shape. Olivier Giroud no longer has the legs to press and Mbappé has little interest in using his energy to get about the pitch to close down the opposition. Though with Mbappé ambling back into the half-space, if France were able to turnover possession and find the flying forward quickly, opposition security would immediately be at risk with Mbappé able to run directly at the defence and exploit his pace to its maximum potential.
Now Antonio is no Mbappé; the fluid movements, feints, drag-backs and unstoppably deceptive finishing (look to the right, open up, before cutting across the ball to ping it into the near-post) of the Frenchman may all evade our Jamaican forward, but Antonio does possess the speed required to realise the threats of this slightly lopsided defensive system. He would be more than capable of rolling and driving down the left half-space, or wing, and dragging players across before finding a backwards pass to open space or a cross to any of the late-arrivers in the box.
Some of the other similarities drawn out in this comparison are compelling. Where Griezmann possesses the kind of creative ability that can unlock a defence, he also has the defensive bullishness typical of a player coached by Diego Simeone for so long. And although Lucas Paquetá has largely featured as a number ten since his £51 million transfer from Olympique Lyonnais in the summer, the Brazilian often features alongside Casemiro at the base of Tite’s 4-2-3-1 for his country. In theory, he would also have the combination of offensive ingenuity and defensive doggedness necessitated by Deschamps’ hybrid midfield.
In the 2021-22 Ligue 1 season, Paquetá recorded 2.57 tackles and interceptions while providing 4.4 passes to the final third per 90. Similarly, at the World Cup, Griezmann made 3.69 tackles and interceptions while playing 4.36 passes to the final third per 90. The key difference between the two, and the catch if there is one, is in their penetrative ability. Griezmann offered 0.6 xA (Opta) per 90 for France at the World Cup where Paquetá produced just 0.16 xA per 90 last season in Ligue 1, 0.17 at the World Cup for Brazil, and just 0.07 per 90 so far this season in the Premier League. Still, that combination of defensive ability and progressive quality makes this comparison intriguing.
Likewise, there are several aspects of Gianluca Scamacca’s game that would seem to be, at least superficially, comparable to the qualities offered by Giroud. The Italian has often been seen hanging back from the box when teammates have advanced down the flanks and, with him preferring to arrive late rather than spearheading counters, his deep combination qualities would make him a directly transposable asset within these theoretical structures.
Against Brentford, though we saw too many examples of wide players looping shoddy crosses into the box for Scamacca to attack, we did see some of the potential value of the Italian’s link-up play when he is allowed to drop deep and combine in order to release others.
Finally, in Pablo Fornals – who hasn’t started a Premier League game since West Ham’s 0-1 loss to Liverpool in October – David Moyes has a creative midfielder more than happy to operate in deeper areas. Whilst he’s no Adrien Rabiot, the two are completely different types of midfielders, Fornals would surely be defensively competent enough to cover the exposed wide space behind the left forward as a defensive winger – it’s a role he’s carried out brilliantly for years – while being able to combine on the left with Aaron Cresswell and Declan Rice to release quick counters or reestablish control.
This comparison is intriguing and surely worth consideration. West Ham must find a way to get Scamacca and Paquetá into the team without obliterating previous areas of strength and, in Deschamps’ World Cup tactics, they might find inspiration to recapture that irrepressible threat on the counter.
For more on this, please read “Could West Ham Play 442?” from back in August where I first suggested a hybrid approach to the midfield in order to incorporate Scamacca alongside the already well-connected trio of Antonio, Fornals and Bowen. And please do consider subscribing to read more articles just like this.
